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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
Klt\1BALL ELEVATOR COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8066

ELEVATOR SUPPLIES COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

POINTS STATED IN ANSWER TO PETITION
Defendant and appellant Elevator Supplies Company,
Inc., comes now and respectfully files this Brief in. Answer
to Petition for Rehearing, and defendant and appellant respectfully submits that the decision of this Honorable Court dated
July 21, 1954, is just and correct, and that the decision is
predicated upon the facts and rendered strictly according to
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law. The defendant and appellant alleges that the petition
for rehearing misstates the facts and misconstrues the decision.
Said petition is entirely without merit and should be denied.
Said petition for rehearing is answered under the following
points:
1. There was no competent proof of any nimplied con-

tract" to submit to the jury; consequently, there is no basis
for the contention {(That the Court in its decision on file herein
has not considered the findings of fact arrived upon by the
. ''
Jury.
2. There is no substance to the argument of plaintiff

''That the Court in its decision has made irreconcilable statements relative to the issues.''
3. The argument HThat the Court has misconstrued the
facts in its application of the law and has committed error
thereby," disregards the admitted facts and the essential elements of a contract.
4. The claim ''That through its decision the Court would
commit an injustice," is specious, since only the plaintiff sought
to perpetrate injustice.

ARGUMENT
Point 1
THERE WAS NO COMPETENT PROOF OF ANY
"IMPLIED CONTRACT" TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY;
CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE CON-
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TENTION nTHAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ON
FILE HEREIN HAS NOT CONSIDERED THE FINDINGS
OF FACT ARRIVED UPON BY THE JURY."
The decision of this Honorable Court is inexorably right.
There is no merit to the petition for rehearing. Plaintiff mis.construes the opinion of the Court, and contradicts the record
on appeal. In declaring that this Court nhas not considered
the findings of f'act arrived upon by the jury," the plaintiff
entirely disregards the basic error of the trial judge in submitting the case to the jury when there was no competent
evidence of any nimplied agreement." Plaintiff guotes from
a number of the prejudicially erroneous instructions of the
trial court, as if it were perfectly proper to invite the jury
to ignore the admissions made by plaintiff and the stipulations
of the parties as well as the undisputed fact that defendant
never told plaintiff that it would refrain from giving anyone
a bona fide bid. This Court properly held that there was no
competent evidence of any nimplied agreement not to s:ompete," and consequently there was nothing to submit to the jury.
By its petition for rehearing, plaintiff would have this
Court disregard all of the elementary rules of contract. Plaintiff
in effect asks this Court to reverse itself and to hold that an
"agreement not to compete" can be implied from a series
of stale unaccepted written offers and other fruitless negotiations which did not even mention the subject of competition.
The decision is correct, for the evidence demonstrated that
there was no legal consideration to support any agreement,
there was never any discussion of the subject, and there was
no meeting of the minds. The admissions of plaintiff and
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the stipulated facts as well as other undisputed evidence, were
all fatal to the contentions of plaintiff that there was some
kind of an nimplied agreement not to compete with the
plaintiff."
There is no substance to the contention that it was
"understood" that defendant was to submit a "mere estimate
and not a firm bid" to Utah Hotel Company. Hotel Utah
had been a customer of defendant for over two years-a fact
which plaintiff would like this Court to forget. ~laintiff
itself presented ~he evidence which conclusively proved that
plaintiff knew Utah Hotel Company wanted a firm bid from
defendant on the entire modernization project, and that plaintiff
recognized the right of defendant to submit such bid and
made no objections to it, but on the contrary told Pacific
Elevator and Equipment Company that it was all right to
submit a bid to defendant on a portion of the project, knowing
that defendant would use such bid in its overall bid.
Mr. Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, called
as a witness for plaintiff, not only testified that the bid. submitted by plaintiff was so unacceptable that he did not care
to invite Kimball to submit any other bid; but that he asked
defendant to submit a firm bid on the overall job. He testified
that he told Mr. Roy C. Smith, district manager of defendant, that he expected defendant to present a straight-for-'
ward bid which could be accepted by the hotel (R. 248).
Mr. Charles M. ·Henker, who testified for plaintiff, stated
that defendant asked Pacific Elevator and Equipment Com·
pany to submit a bid on a portion of the elevator modernization
on an installed basis; that Mr. Henker said it would be all
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right nif it is all right with the Kimball Elevator Company,"
as Kimball was the territorial representative of Pacific (R.
673-674, 688). Mr. Henker also testified that he came to
Salt Lake City with Roy C. Smith to make a thorough survey
of the job ((down to the last detail, preparatory to making
up a finn bid to Elevator Supplies Company" (R. 676). When
he arrived in Salt Lake City, Mr. Henker told Mr. Connole
that he had been requested by Elevator Supplies· Company
to give a bid on a portion of the Hotel U tab job on an
installed basis, and that he wanted to be sure that Mr.
Connole had no objections. Mr. Connole told him that he
knew that the hotel management had requested additional
bids (R. 718). In consequence of that discussion, after being
assured that plaintiff had no objections, Pacific submitted
to defendant a firm bid dated September 7, 1950 (R. 717).
Pacific then gave plaintiff a revised bid in view of what Pacific
and defendant had learned from an inspection of the job
site, but plaintiff did nothing about the revised bid from
Pacific.
Mr. Connole admitted that he told Mr. Henker it was
all right to submit a bid to defendant (R. 572). He also testified: (!The Elevator Supplies Company requested the information from Mr. Henker, and Mr. Henker refused to give it to
them, until he had my permission and that it was finally under-

stood that I knew they were bidding it" (R. 572). He also
testified that Mr. Henker told him that ((Elevator Supplies
Company was bidding on this job and had asked Pacific Elevator and Equipment to furnish them a quotation. He told
n1e that he could not give them a quotation, because we were
figuring the job and representing them-unless it was with
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our permission. I told him it was all right" (R. 573). When
asked if Roy C. Smith ever told him that defendant would
not submit a bona fide bid to Hotel Utah, Mr. Connole
answered, ttNo" (R. 589). When asked whether he tried to
keep Hotel Utah from getting a bid o~ the over-all job from
defendant, Mr. Connole answered: «ti ·was never aware that
Elevator Supplies would bid the job. I wasn't trying to keep
them from it" (R. 579).
Notwithstanding there was no competent evidence of
any ((implied contract," plaintiff argues in effect that since the
trial court permitted the jury to ttfind" that a ttcontract" of
such a nature existed, this Court should uphold the verdict
which was contrary to the facts and contrary to law. If
carried to its ultimate conclusion, such an argument would
dispense with all appellate courts.
The argument of plaintiff misquotes the decision of this
Court. Plaintiff makes assertions which are beside the point
and which are predicated on false assumptions, as illustrated
by the following comment:
and although the Court further recognizes
in its decision that Kimball had a right to exact a covenant from Elevator Supplies that it would not compete,
in consideration of an understanding that Kimball
would sub-let part of the work to Elevator Supplies;
and further that it is not only permissible but common
practice for a wholesaler to contract not to sell to
retail customers . . . The Court rules against th~
plaintiff.''
cc

•

•

•

There is no evidence that Kimball Elevator Company
ever «texacted a covenant from Elevator Supplies that it would
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not compete." Nor is there any evidence that Kimball ever
promised to sub-let part of the work to Elevator Supplies
Company, Inc., when Kimball requested bids. The requests
for bids will be searched in vain for any such suggestion. No
such pretense was ever made at the trial. Furthermore, the
exhibits clearly show that plaintiff generally did not award
any contract to defendant, notwithstanding the numerous bids
defendant submitted upon express request of plaintiff. In
the case of dumb-waiter elevators, Kimball requested bids
on repeated occasions and always obtained such bids from
defendant, but Kimball invariably awarded the contracts to

competitors of defendant. While plaintiff asked defendant
for quotations on control equipment, plaintiff never at any
time awarded a contract or purchase order to defendant for
any type of control equipment. With respect to the Park
Building job in 1950, plaintiff admitted that it procured successive bids from defendant on controls, and on other portions
of the work; yet, the contract on the controls was awarded
to Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company.

The written

instruments conclusively demonstrate that in 1950 there could
not have been any ((understanding" to award defendant the
portions of elevator construction on which plaintiff asked
defendant to bid, for the reason that plaintiff awarded nearly
all of the elevator construction work to Pacific Elevator and
Equipment Company (of which firm plaintiff was the territorial representative).
Contrary to the assertions of plaintiff, there was no proof
of any «(common practice for a wholesaler to contract not
to sell to retail customers."

Plaintiff's own witness, Mr.

Charles M. Henker, expressly stated that there was no such
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practice. The argument of plaintiff would not be in point anyway, for Utah Hotel Company had been and was then the
customer of defendant, not the customer of plaintiff. Nor
was there any evidence that defendant was a mere wholesaler,
nor that plaintiff was a retailer for defendant. Plaintiff was
not a ((distributor" for defendant in any sense. Likewise,
there was no evidence that defendant was a nsupplier of
plaintiff," for the evidence showed that in 23 years plaintiff
purchased very little from defendant. Plaintiff was not even
a regular customer. The dealings were only occasional, and
plaintiff never purchased anything from defendant if plaintiff
could make a better deal with someone else. Most of defendant's business was with other companies, and that fact
was known to plaintiff. Although defendant issued catalogs,
the plaintiff invariably asked defendant to submit written
bids on equipment, except occasionally in the case of repair
parts which plaintiff could not purchase from some other company. In more than 2 3· years, notwithstanding the numerous
bids submitted by defendant at the specific requests of plaintiff,
the plaintiff awarded defendant only 7 contracts, one of
which was later canceled. During all of those years of negotiations, plaintiff did not even hint that it expected defendant
to refrain from giving an honest bid to someone else. The
argument of plaintiff ignores the admission of Mr. Connole
at the trial that the subject of refraining from competition
was never discussed (R. 632). There was no competent evidence that plaintiff ever asked defendant to refrain from
giving a bid to any person or to a class of persons.
This Court did not hold that under the circumstances
of this case plaintiff could have exacted from defendant a
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covenant not to compete. However, it is not a question of
what the parties might have done, but a question of what
they actually did. In this case the subject of competition was
never discussed. There was no consideration furnished by
plaintiff to support any kind of an agreement, express or
implied; and there was no meeting of the minds on ({refraining
from competition, for not even the plaintiff ever thought of such
an idea until suit was instituted.
Counsel for plaintiff does not point out any competent
evidence which could possibly spell out any of the essential
elements of a contract, express or implied. If an ({implied
contract" could be fashioned out of the nebulous negotiations
which came to naught-out of expired unaccepted offers and
other fruitless negotiations, there is no situation in which a
jury with sufficient imagination could not ((find" a contract
in spite of the lack of the meeting of minds and the absence
of consideration and all other essentials of a valid contract.
The argument of plaintiff also seeks to avoid the uncontradicted testimony introduced by plaintiff which showed that
the relations between plaintiff and Hotel Utah were unsatisfactory; that plaintiff had previously installed equipment which
did not work successfully, and that plaintiff's bid to the hotel
was not satisfactory in either form or content; and that the
hotel management was unwilling to communicate further
with plaintiff, and requested defendant to submit a firm bid
on the entire modernization project.
The trial court should have granted the n1otion for a
directed verdict, inasmuch as there was no competent evidence
of the meeting of the minds nor of any legal consideration
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nor any other essential elements of a contract to submit to the
jury. There was no acceptance of an offer to give rise to a
contract. Counsel for plaintiff has attempted to supply deficiencies in the evidence by arguments which are contrary
to the evidence. The decision is right, and the criticism of it
by plaintiff is without factual or legal basis.

Point 2

THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE ARGUMENT
ttTHAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION HAS MADE
IRRECONCILABLE STATEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE

ISSUES.''
The plaintiff makes the unfounded assertion that this
Honorable Court t(has made irreconcilable statements relative
to the issues." Plaintiff makes statements which are irreconcilable with the record on appeal.
On page 10 plaintiff takes issue with this Court for saying
that tCHotel Utah indicated that it wanted another bid and
there is no showing that it expected or desired anything other
than a bona fide one.'' Plaintiff has no basis for complaining
about that statement in the opinion, for plaintiffs O\vn witnesses proved such to be the fact. Now plaintiff wants to erase
that fact by saying that the "desires" of Hotel Utah Hwere
not at issue before the trial court or the jury." Contrary to
such assertion, the desires of Hotel Utah were very much in
point. As owner of the property which was to be remodeled,
Utah Hotel Company had the right to decide what work
should be done, who should bid on the project and to whom
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an award of a contract should be made. Utah Hotel Company
was paying for the work. It had the unquestioned right to
obtain a bona fide bid frorn defendant with which it had
been doing business regularly for over two years. Any interference with such rights of Hotel Utah would be wrongful.
By saying that {(The Hotel Utah is not a party to this
proceeding," plaintiff seems to take the position that the rights
of the hotel company should be disregarded. If there had
been an agreement such as pleaded in the amended complaint,
whereby it was alleged that defendant was to submit a bid
$18,000 or $19,000 higher than the bid previously submitted
by plaintiff, such an agreement_ would have been collusive
and void as a fraud against Hotel Utah. Plaintiff, of course,
went to trial on a theory which contradicted the theory of
its amended complaint, in claiming that there really was no
agreement for defendant to submit a bid to Hotel Utah at
all, but an {(implied agreement" to refrain from submitting
a bid. Apparently, plaintiff took the position that the mere act
of submission of a bid by defendant to plaintiff, gave rise to
an ((implied agreement," although there was no consideration,
no acceptance of any offer, and no possible contract. Plaintiff
changed its theory every time it seemed convenient to do so,
and there was never any substance to any claim made by
plaintiff.
Plaintiff even tries to contradict this Court on the basis
of hearsay and other incompetent evidence. For example,
plaintiff says that Mr. Connole ntold" Mr. Jerry Smith of
Hotel Utah that the hotel could use a bid from defendant
"as an estimate." The testimony of Mr. Connole was incom-
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petent as hearsay, for no representative of defendant was
present. However, even the hearsay evidence does not bridge
the gap for the plaintiff. Suppose for the sake of argument,
(contrary to the actual testimony of Jerry Smith, given later) ,
that Mr. Connole had actually told Jerry Smith (building
superintendent of Hotel Utah, who had no authority to make
contracts) that Hotel Utah could use the bid it received from
defendant as "an estimate." Just how could that fetter Hotel
Utah? Mr. Connole would have been presumptuous indeed
to make such a statement. And just how could such an alleged
remark have prevented defendant from submitting a bona
fide bid as requested by Utah Hotel Company? Defendant
did not promise to refrain from giving a firm bid. The evidence
is conclusive that the only kind of a bid solicited by the hotel
from defendant was a bona fide bid; and since the hotel had
been a customer of defendant Elevator Supplies Company,
Inc., for over two years, the hotel management expected a
straight-forward bid from defendant. Such evidence was produced by plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Carpenter, manager
of Hotel Utah.
Plaintiff tries to infer that someone on behalf of Hotel
Utah agreed to receive a mere estimate'' from defendant.
Not even Kimball's manager, Mr. Connole, made any such
claim. Mr. Connole admitted that Jerry Smith stated that the
hotel wanted a bid from defendant on the entire project. Mr.
Connole made no pretense that he spoke to Mr. Carpenter,
who was the only one who could make any contract for the
hotel. An examination of Mr. Connole's testimony discloses
that he made no claim to Jerry Smith that there was any
agreement between plaintiff and defendant which would make
t t
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it impossible for defendant to submit a firm bid. What Mr.
Connole attempted to do was to see if he could talk Jerry
Smith and Hotel Utah out of getting a bid from defendant.
Mr. Connole suggested that the hotel get a bid from Westinghouse. He knew the hotel wanted firm bids and not mere
"estimates." Mr. Connole even resorted to misrepresentation
by falsely saying to Jerry Smith that it would be useless to
get a bid from defendant because it tcwould be identical with
the bid'' submitted by plaintiff. The bid which defendant submitted was vastly different from the abortive bid submitted
to the hotel by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contradicts the record with impunity by claiming
that Hotel Utah would have ((received identical equipment"
and a complete renovation at nlower cost" tcif the defendant
had remained true to its contract and submitted an estimate
to the hotel rather than its firm quotation.''
There was no contract whatsoever, and there was no
possible meeting of the minds to refrain from submitting
an honest bid to anyone. Never at any time prior to suit did
plaintiff even pretend that there was any contract. When
suit was filed plaintiff alleged an express collusive agreement
to submit a bid. At the pre-trial conference, plaintiff apparently
realized that it could not prevail on any claim that there was
an express agreement for defendant to present a bid, particularly a bid which would have been collusive and void.
Plaintiff abandoned the theory of its pleadings and claimed
an "implied agreement" to refrain from submitting a bid to
Hotel Utah. Plaintiff abandoned one fictitious claim and
adopted another which was entirely inconsistent with the one
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pleaded. In neither case did plaintiff allege any consideration,
nor ·state a valid contract.
There is no excuse for plaintiff to say that Hotel Utah
would have "received identical equipment" "at lower cost"
if defendant had not submitted a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff's abortive bid omitted a number of essential
items, which refutes the contention that the hotel would have
received identical equipment at less cost. There was no evidence that the hotel management would accept plaintiff's
unsatisfactory bid. Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Carpenter,
testified that the hotel had had unsatisfactory dealings with
plaintiff in the past, and that the bid of August 16, 1950, was
wholly unacceptable to the hotel and the management refused
to consider it further. He also said the hotel did not care to
invite Kimball to submit any further bid. Thus, the contention
that plaintiff would have been awarded the contract is a myth.
Plaintiff neither had a contract with Hotel Utah nor with
·defendant. No reasonable mind could possibly reach the conclusion from the evidence that plaintiff would have been
awarded the contract by Hotel Utah. And there was no one
to blame except the plaintiff.
Plaintiff also criticizes this Court for saying that defendant
understood that it was to submit a bona fide bid. The plaintiff's
own evidence would preclude any other conclusion. Although
Mr. ·Connole testified that he told Mr. Roy C. Smith, district
manager of defendant corporation, to submit a "supporting
bid" to Hotel Utah, when pressed to state what Roy C.
Smith said in response to the alleged request, Mr. Connole admitted that he could not remenzber just what Roy C. Smith
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said to him (R. 578). Consequently, there was no competent
proof that defendant even made a naked promise.
It is obvious that there was no consideration of any kind
furnished by plaintiff which could have made any promise
binding, even if a promise had been made (of which there is
no competent evidence), and even if such a promise could
have been legal. Of course, even if plaintiff had asked defendant to submit to Hotel Utah something other than an
honest bid, such a request could not have imposed any obligation on defendant. Plaintiff had no supervision over the
affairs of defendant. If Kimball had become so arrogant as
to attempt to dictate to Elevator Supplies Company, the latter
certainly would not have had to pay any attention to such
impudent conduct of Kimball. No one in his right mind
would have the audacity to say that defendant had a duty
to give Hotel Utah a dishonest bid. Plaintiff attempts to dignify a fictitious or collusive bid by calling it ttan engineer's
estimate.''
There is no basis in the record for the argument that
defendant misled the plaintiff. No tort claim was ever pleaded.
There was no evidence that defendant ever misled the plaintiff,
and no such claim was made at the trial. As pointed out hereinafter, the only party guilty of any misleading tactics and
misrepresentations was the plaintiff.
The argument that defendant had not previously bid on
an entire modernization job is irrelevant. It does not show any
rneeting of the minds to preclude defendant from submitting
a bid to the owner of property. The evidence was undisputed
that defendant submitted bids to other firms, and most of
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defendant's business was with other companies. There is no
evidence of any meeting of the minds between plaintiff and
defendant nor any of the other essential elements of a con.
tract, express or implied; and plaintiff admits there was no
express contract.
Counsel for plaintiff says, "We respectfully challenge',
the findings made by this Court in opposition to the con·
elusions of the jury who had opportunity to peruse the docu·
mentary evidence." Plaintiff overlooks the fact that it was not
the function of the jury to construe the written instruments;
and if the trial court had construed those instruments offered
by plaintiff according to their tenor, the case would not have
been submitted to the jury. Those instruments consisted of
.requests for bids, and written offers which had never been
accepted. Under no circumstances could any trier of the facts
acting as a reasonable mind ttfind" an ttimplied contract not
to compete" from the numerous stale written offers which
tt

had never been accepted.
This Honorable Court has not made any "irreconcilable
statements" relative to the facts ot the applicable principles
of law. It is the argument of plaintiff in its petition for rehearing which is irreconcilable with both facts and law.

Point 3
THE ARGUMENT ttTHAT THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS IN ITS APPLICATION OF
THE LAW AND HAS COMMITTED ERROR THEREBY",
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DISREGARDS THE ADMITTED FACTS AND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT.
Counsel for plaintiff attempts to take issue with this
Court for holding inadmissible the conclusions of Mr. Charles
M. Henker. The quoted portions of the testimony of Mr.
Henker set out on pages 13, to 17 of the petition for rehearing,
certain! y do not justify any alteration of the decision of this
Court. The trial court should have sustained the objections
to the conclusions of Mr. Henker, wherein he stated his ((impressions'' rather than the conversations. Council for plaintiff
assumes that if a witness says he cannot relate a conversation
'vord for word, he can draw conclusions and give his nimpressions" instead of relating the substance of what was said by
the persons involved in a conversation. The text statements
quoted by plaintiff on pages 18 and 19 do not aid the position
of the plaintiff, for they are not in point. None of them state
that a witness can resort to conclusions.
There is no merit to the contention that this Honorable
Court has misconstrued the facts in its application of the law.
Plaintiff appears to be unwilling to deal with the salient facts.
The testimony of Mr. Benker, which plaintiff neglected to
quote, illustrates the viciousness of the statement of ((impressions'' and conclusions, for Mr. Henker later admitted that
Pacific Elevator and Equipment. Company was asked to give
defendant a firm bid; that it was necessary to make a trip to
Salt Lake City for that purpose, and that Pacific was unwilling
to give defendant a firm bid on a portion of the job without
a clearance from plaintiff, since plaintiff was territorial representative of Pacific.
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The plaintiff sought to establish the untenable claim that
an implied agreement to refrain from competing with an
offeree can be created out of a series of expired unaccepted
written offers and other negotiations which had terminated
months previously, in which offers and negotiations there was
not even any hint of refraining from submitting a bid to anyone else. Such a concept is contrary to elementary rules of
contract which require an offer to be accepted in order to result
in a valid contract. It is not the Supreme Court of Utah which
is in error as inferred by plaintiff. The plaintiff is in error
for assuming that a contract can be implied from stale unaccepted offers which do not even suggest that either the
offeror or the offeree entertained any such idea as contended
by plaintiff.

Point 4
THE CLAIM CCTHAT THROUGH ITS DECISION THE
COURT WOULD COMMIT AN INJUSTICE," IS SPECIOUS, SINCE ONLY THE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO PERPETRATE INJUSTICE.
In the teeth of plaintiff's own admissions in the record,
counsel for plaintiff makes the absurd argument that the nundisputed facts are contrary to the decision of July 21," and
that ccthis Court would commit a dire injustice, in that the
plaintiff would not only lose a contractual right, but also be
held as a party to a collusive agreement."
This Court does not deprive plaintiff of any contractual
right, for no such contractual right as contended for by
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I

plaintiff ever came into existence. Furthermore, this Court is
entirely right as to what it says about a collusive agreement.
If plaintiff had entered into an agreement with defendant
whereby defendant agreed to refrain from submitting a bona
fide bid to Utah Hotel Company, when both parties knew
the hotel sought good faith bids, such an agreement would
have been collusive and void as a fraud on the hotel company
as owner of the property. That would have been especially
true in this case where the hotel company had been a customer
of defendant for over two years, and relied on defendant to
furnish an honest bid.

I

The decision of this Court fosters justice. What plaintiff
seeks is not justice, but injustice to defendant. Prior to the
date when suit was" filed, plaintiff never made any claim
to anyone that there was any kind of agreement existing
between plaintiff and defendant, express or implied. From
the time suit was filed until the date of pre-trial conference,
the only kind of agreement which plaintiff alleged was an
express collusive agreement whereby defendant supposedly
promised to submit a bid to Utah Hotel Company in an amount
$18,000 or $19,000 in excess of the bid previously submitted
by plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that in t(vio~ation" of such ((agreement'' defendant made a firm bid and accepted an award of
the contract (R. 34-41). Thus, plaintiff asserted an express
agreement to submit a collusive bid which was patently void.
The cases cited by plaintiff on pages 20 and 21 of its petition
for rehearing, are not in point, for plaintiff alleged matters
\vhich would show that plaintiff was barred from recovery
as a matter of law.
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Obviously, plaintiff did not expect to prevail on any such
theory. Consequently, at the pre-trial conference plaintiff
sought to escape from its plea of an illegal collusive agreement
by asserting something entirely different-an implied agreement to refrain from submitting any firm bid .. Nothing was
stated which could be construed to amount to legal consideration for any implied agreement" of any kind. The trial court
should have summarily disposed of plaintiff's fictitious and
illegal claims by granting the motion to dismiss.
tt

There is no justification for the argument of plaintiff on
page 21 that ((justice and fair dealing are sponsored" by
plaintiff's theory of the case. A scheme to submit a fictitious
bid is fraudulent. Likewise any agreement to prevent an owner
of property from getting an honest bid is anything but
((justice and fair dealing." Either scheme would be illegal,
and give rise to a cause of action in favor of the victim. The
further assertion on the part of the plaintiff that if the decision
of July 21 is not reconsic!_ered, uthis court sanctions breach
of contract, unfair dealing and dishonesty," is downright
impudent. There was no contract which could possibly be
breached, since no contract ever came into existence on any
such subject.
This Court does not sanction unfair dealing and dis·
honesty by rendering its decision, but quite the contrary. The
plaintiff, however, sought to perpetrate injustice by attempting
to exact thousands of dollars from the defendant by fictitious
claims, without any semblance of consideration.
Plaintiff resorted to unfair tactics not only with defendant,
but also with Hotel Utah. Mr. Connole induced the defendant
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to submit its bid dated June 14, 1950, by falsely representing
that Kimball was being awarded the modernizat~on contract.
Mr. Connole knew that statement was false, and he knew
that the hotel wanted other bids, and that the hotel management had never promised to award the contract to plaintiff.
When plaintiff learned that the hotel management wanted
bid from defendant C>n the entire modernization project, Mr.
Connole tried to discourage the hotel grom getting such a bid
by falsely representing that the bid from defendant would be
identical with the one submitted by plaintiff. The evi~ence is
conclusive that the bid submitted by plaintiff was· incomplete
and omitted numerous essential items, and the bid submitted
by defendant was entirely different, not only as to price, but
as to substance and form.

a

As unsuccessful bidder, plaintiff was guilty of perpetrating
a series of injustices. First, plaintiff wrongfully attempted
to exact from defendant as successful bidder, a 10ro "commission" although plaintiff knew defendant had never promised any commission or any other ((cut," and plaintiff knew
it was not employed by defendant. When defendant refused
to submit to such an outrageous exaction, plaintiff tried to
coax Utah Hotel Company to pay a tccommission" which could
not have been owing under any possible stretch of the imagination. When that scheme was rebuffed, plaintiff unconscionably
attempted to induce Utah Hotel Company to cancel its contract with defendant on the pass.enger elevators and to issue
a contract for the same price to the plaintiff (R. 590-591,
238, 240, 250-251, 239-240). Plaintiff admitted that defendant
never told plaintiff at any time that defendant would give
plaintiff a ((cut" out of the job if the hotel company awarded
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the contracts to defendant and that there were no promises
(R. 589-590).
Plaintiff made further attempts to perpetrate injustice,
in the effort to get something for nothing, by filing suit on a
claim of a purported collusive agreement for defendant to
submit a bid, and finally by claiming breach of an "implied
agreement'' not to submit a firm bid. Plaintiff wasted thousands of dollars of the time of the courts as well as subjecting
the defendant to the unjust burden of defending against spurious claims.
Defendant has no disagreement with the general rule cited
by plaintiff to the effect that where a contract exists, which is
capable of a construction in accordance with fair dealing and
justice, the courts will adopt such construction. Such rule has
no application here, for there was no contract of any kind
since plaintiff did not accept any offer of defendant to bring
any contract into being. Furthermore, the citations furnished
by plaintiff to the effect that agreements may be legal if made
to protect rights and there is no purpose to in jure or defraud
others, are not in point. There were no contract rights for
plaintiff to protect; but even if there had been an agreement
to submit a bid which would not be a firm bid, such an agree·
ment would have been one to injure or defraud Hotel Utah,
and the agreement would have been void. However, plaintiff
had no agreement of any kind with defendant, legal or illegal. Plaintiff had no contract rights with Utah Hotel Company to protect. Plaintiff neglected to submit a bid which
covered the items required by the hotel, so that plaintiff had
no hope of being awarded a contract.
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The conduct of plaintiff in attempting to exact thousands
of dollars from defendant as successful bidder, by one wrongful
schetne after another, is reprehensible, to say the least. This
Court correctly and appropriately ruled against the plaintiff
in accordance with la\v and in harmony with the facts.

CONCLUSION
The decision of this Honorable Court is right and just.
It remedies a grievous injustice. There is neither factual nor
legal basis for disturbing the decision of this Court handed
down on July 21, 1954. The petition for rehearing filed by
plaintiff misstates the facts, misconstrues the decision of this
Court, and makes unwarranted objections. There is no merit
to the petition for rehearing, for it does not seek to promote
justice, but injustice. Said petition for rehearing should be
denied without further hearing or argument.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. REIMANN and
HOWARD J. CANTUS,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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